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ABSTRACT 
 The Congruence Model describes the idea that a team can only succeed when the 
defined components of people, structure, work, and culture all fit together. A key concept 
of The Congruence Model also identifies the interconnected relationships between 
components to understand how changes in one area affect performance in others. This 
model does not, however, include tacit knowledge as a core factor when assessing overall 
congruency. The research described in this study used data points from real-world Cyber 
Protection Team member input to build scope-complete behavior models that replicate 
the pathologies between organization components. Cyber Protection Teams—a subset of 
teams within the Cyber Mission Force—provided the vehicle to analyze how teams 
capture, develop, and maintain knowledge in day-to-day defensive cyberspace operations. 
The intended benefit of our research introduces tacit knowledge as the fifth contributing 
factor in The Congruence Model to identify prescriptions for knowledge management 
practices that positively interact with existing components to improve overall 
organization efficiency. 
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“Knowledge is regarded as a fluid mix of framed experiences, values, context, 
insight, and intuition” (Davenpooty & Prusak, 1998). Knowledge Management (KM) 
provides a framework for creating, promoting, and sharing knowledge. The subsequent 
accumulation and distribution of knowledge is a crucial variable in the success of an 
organization. The analysis of knowledge and how organizations use it become more 
efficient and effective is an important area of study. For the U.S. military, knowledge 
discipline area has proven to be a complex and persistent challenge. The Congruence 
Model (TCM), developed in the 1980s by David A. Nadler and Michael L. Tushman, 
frames the bond between the core factors of an organization to identify methods for 
performance improvement (Janse, 2019). TCM—displayed below in Figure 1—identifies 
and correlates critical elements of an organization’s people, the work they do, structure in 
which they operate, and the resulting culture. The application of these internal components 
lies at the heart of our research. 
 
Figure 1. The Congruence Model. Source: Mercer Delta 
(1998) 
In 2012, the Joint Staff and Commander, United States Cyber Command 
(USCYBERCOM) directed the armed services to build the Cyber Mission Force (CMF), a 
2 
distributed effort consisting of approximately 6,100 joint military personnel operating 
across 133 teams to direct, synchronize, and coordinate cyberspace operations 
(ARCYBER, 2020). Figure 2 captures a visual summary of the Cyber Mission Force 
organization chart. 
 
Figure 2. Department of Defense Cyber Mission Force 
Relationships. Source: JCS (2018). 
Cyber Protection Teams (CPTs), a tactically focused subset of teams collectively 
referred to as the Cyber Protection Force (CPF), were tasked in part with the defense of 
friendly cyberspace networks, data, and capabilities. CPTs play a critical role in the 
Department of Defense’s (DOD’s) defense-in-depth strategy. CPT personnel are routinely 
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organized into small groups (5-7 members) called Mission Elements (ME) that conduct 
essential network security assessments for U.S. military networks around the world.  
A CPT’s ability to conduct defensive cyberspace operations involves a complex 
mesh of knowledge areas which may be difficult or impossible to codify. The heart of our 
research lies within the challenges faced by CPTs which balance both billet manning and 
knowledge retention in the execution of defensive cyberspace operations. This connection 
ultimately bridges the gap between the issues impact the CPF and our study of tacit 
knowledge as an additional core factor in TCM. 
B. PURPOSE / SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH 
Explicit knowledge is the most common and formal way to transfer knowledge in 
both verbal and written forms. Alternatively, tacit knowledge gained through personal 
experience and perspective is extremely difficult to transfer from one person to another. 
Cyber Protection Teams face this relentless challenge while manning, training, and 
equipping team personnel for missions across the globe. There is a noticeable gap between 
the retention efforts of explicit and tacit knowledge bases in the teams. In particular, 
knowledge is lost when members depart from a CPT without an effective way to transfer 
their hard-earned experience to other personnel. The lack of comprehensive tools or 
approaches needed to maintain and implement organizational effectiveness negatively 
impact CPT training and mission execution. These points were synthesized to form our two 
research questions: 
1. How does the inclusion of tacit knowledge into The Congruence Model 
impact the model’s determination of organizational fit and performance? 
2. How can tacit knowledge be measured within the Cyber Protection 
Team’s as a method to test its inclusion into The Congruence Model? 
We approached these questions using our research and understanding of knowledge 
to develop tailored questionnaires that were completed by fourteen members across five 
CPTs in the Pacific theater. This data was analyzed to determine the value and flow of tacit 
knowledge, the impact of its loss, and its potential to measure organizational congruence. 
4 
The four tenant concepts of the Congruence Model are processes, organization, personnel, 
and technologies. Using these elements, we analyzed the Protection Teams to understand 
the core work that occurs and pathologies that develop between internal components. We 
hypothesized that tacit knowledge could be measured and applied as part of TCM to 
identify the inefficiencies of an organization and prescribe relevant solutions. 
C. SCOPE 
The scope of this research focused on the internal components of a CPT’s work, 
people, and structure to identify pathologies and / or barriers related to knowledge flow. 
The input, output and culture were excluded from our research to focus on the internal 
pieces within each team. Analysis was conducted on real-world pathologies that develop 
between CPT personnel, the work they do, and the structure in which they operate. The 
goal of our research was to frame, analyze, and model the teams to understand how tacit 
knowledge affects organization performance. This thesis is supported by Naval 
Postgraduate School (NPS) as a subproject within the Naval Research Program (NRP), 
sponsored by OPNAV N1-Manpower, Personnel, Training, and Education (MPT&E), 
Developing a Formal Knowledge Management (KM) Process (Nissen & Gallup, 2013). 
D. THESIS ORGANIZATION 
This research is organized as follows: 
• Chapter II covers the literature review for knowledge and knowledge 
relationships, an in-depth look at The Congruence Model, and relevant 
information about Cyber Protection Teams. 
• Chapter III identifies the methodology of our data collection and three-
stage analysis used to analyze that data. 
• Chapter IV discusses how each stage of analysis was used each to identify 
the presence of tacit knowledge flows and potential barriers. 
5 
• Chapter V provides our recommendations, study limitations, and 
promising areas for future research of tacit knowledge. 
E. BENEFITS OF STUDY 
This study revealed the benefits of KM application through The Congruence Model 
to analyze and identify organizational inefficiency. This research also identified the 
qualitative benefit to organizational modeling with the inclusion of tacit knowledge as a 
core contributing factor in TCM. Further benefits of this study examined the commonalities 
of the knowledge flow pathologies within the sampled CPTs by identifying barriers that 
affect knowledge transfer and retention. 
  
6 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This chapter reviews the literature and background for knowledge / knowledge 
relationships, an in-depth look at The Congruence Model, and relevant information 
concerning Cyber Protection Teams. This research focused on understanding the role of 
tacit knowledge as an additional core component of The Congruence Model to measure 
organizational congruence of Cyber Protection teams who perform defensive network 
assessments. As a Title 10 unit, Cyber Protection Teams conduct military operations 
despite high rates of personnel turnover. Understanding the connection between defensive 
operations and the intra-personal cohesion was a vital step our effort to understand how 
knowledge manifests and with what value.  
This research focused on understanding the role of tacit knowledge as an additional 
core component in The Congruence Model. The paradigm of personnel loss experienced 
by Cyber Protection Teams provided an excellent opportunity to analyze the fundamental 
value of knowledge and knowledge flow within real-world organizations. As a side effect, 
the outcome of this research exposed prescriptions to limit knowledge loss as personnel 
rotate out of CPT billets.  
A. KNOWLEDGE AS A DOMAIN  
1. Defining Knowledge and Its Boundaries  
Before exploring the value and impact within a CPT, it is important to first establish 
the foundational concepts of knowledge. The Merriam-Webster Dictionary (online) 
defines knowledge as 1. a) “the fact or condition of knowing something with familiarity 
gained through experience or association” b) “the range of one’s information or 
understanding.” 2. a) “the sum of what is known; the body of truth, information, and 
principles acquired by humankind” (2021). Biggam (2001) extends this definition by 
stating that “knowledge can be gained through experience [as well as] rational thought” (p. 
7). This latter idea provides a realistic perspective in the context of human communication. 
The rationale also reveals the human potential to leverage existing bodies of knowledge to 
create, build, or understand a topic. In the wide-ranging field of technology, for example, 
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it is unnecessary to build an integrated circuit from raw components in order to understand 
the functions of digital logic. Analogously, knowledge can be acquired through the study 
of information which already exists.  
Defining knowledge and understanding its acquisition is largely an exercise rooted 
in means rather than ends. It is useful to analyze what combination of factors constitute 
knowledge as much as what that constitution enables (or disables when absent) as a result. 
The core of this idea exists in the “knowing-doing gap” which describes a delta between 
an acquired body of knowledge and how it translates to action or output (Esler et al., 2010). 
A logical assumption, for example, could be made that collecting and disseminating 
knowledge to all parts of an organization will lead to meaningful change. Pfeffer and Sutton 
(1999) identify two problems with this pattern: 1) “knowledge is something explicit and 
quantifiable” and 2) it is “a tangible good and the use of that good in ongoing practice” (p. 
85). These points highlight a subtle, yet important distinction. Knowledge, regardless of 
source, must be both useful and employed to offer the sharpest competitive edge. Simply 
put, knowledge enables action but does not guarantee it.  
2. The Evolution and Flow of Knowledge  
The topic of knowledge is nuanced and understanding without practical application 
may lead to the conclusion that it is a naturally occurring phenomenon. This conclusion, 
however, betrays the relationships necessary for knowledge to exist. Nissen recognized 
these relationships—covered in Harnessing Dynamic Knowledge Principles in the 
Technology-Driven World –between data, information, and knowledge as an actionable / 
abundance hierarchy (Nissen, 2013). Data has the lowest actionability and highest 
abundance in this hierarchy, serving to remove uncertainty about a circumstance. Compiled 
data which enables meaning through context marks the transition to information. 
Collections of information that enable action mark the final transition to knowledge. 
Analyzing these layers in the context of a defensive cyberspace vignette underscores salient 
characteristics about each.  
Data is not actionable, but it is abundant. Within our vignette, data points include 
atomic values—values which cannot be further simplified—such as an IP address, a binary 
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value, or an individual database transaction. These points are valuable to defensive 
operations but do not indicate a requisite action. Data becomes information when it begins 
to enable understanding. Processing data to associate an IP address with a malicious source, 
for example, marks the transition from data into information as defensive operators begin 
to understand the state of a network, but are not necessarily prepared to act. Although less 
abundant than data or information, knowledge balances understanding with courses of 
action that best support an end goal. Pairing mitigation techniques with network 
vulnerabilities provides an informed way to act. The vignette’s inclusion of atomic data 
points, malicious source characterization, and compatible response capabilities display key 
characteristics at each layer of the actionable / abundance hierarchy. 
3. Relationships between Tacit Knowledge and Explicit Knowledge
A foundational understanding of knowledge enables the exploration of its 
characteristics. While tacit and explicit knowledge are both forms of knowledge, they are 
characterized differently. Most explicit knowledge (“know-what”) is articulated and 
codified in formal language, manifest in organizational procedures or policies. CPT-
specific examples of this come in the form of, among others, standard operating 
procedures, defensive tool documentation, and customer network diagrams. These 
“explicit knowledge assets can be reused to solve many similar types of problems or 
connect people with valuable knowledge” (Smith, 2001). The recordable, transferable 
characteristics of explicit knowledge reduce the friction of information sharing and allow 
it to flow with relative ease. 
Tacit knowledge, however, is “difficult to articulate in writing and is acquired 
through personal experience.” (Hansen et al., 1999). The maturation of this knowledge 
drives an individual’s intuition and common sense, enabling a deeper understanding of a 
task. This internalization improves one’s ability to differentiate between courses of action 
(“know-how”) to determine the best response. This deep-rooted, actionable nature of tacit 
knowledge translates to an extremely valuable resource for organizations (Ambrosini & 
Bowman, 2001). This holds true for CPT assessments largely conducted on large, complex 
networks. Timely execution of these assessments relies, in part, on the team’s ability to 
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leverage its aggregated tacit knowledge to operate efficiently and effectively. Despite its 
demonstrable importance, however, this knowledge transfers more slowly than its explicit 
counterpart. Resistance to articulation may also mean that an organization has not codified 
the full scope of knowledge required for its members to accomplish all of its tasks. 
An example involving the Cyber Protection Teams described above is a useful 
exercise to frame the difference between explicit and tacit knowledge. That Cyber 
Protection Teams conduct defensive cyberspace operations is explicit knowledge that can 
be defined, expressed, and understood. In contrast, the ability to conduct effective defensive 
operations involves a complex mesh of professional development and personal experience. 
Enlisted members largely undergo formal training before onboarding with a Protection 
Team. It is reasonable to conclude that upon arrival after successful completion of training, 
personnel largely understand the basics of digital networking. Explicit knowledge of 
routing protocols and cyberspace tool documentation enables an operator to perform 
necessary tasks. In turn, tacit knowledge backed by experience enables tasks to be executed 
efficiently and effectively. While tacit and explicit knowledge both have value, these 
examples demonstrate key differences and reflect systematic issues faced by CPTs across 
the CPF. 
B. THE CONGRUENCE MODEL  
1. Overview of The Congruence Model  
The Congruence Model is centered around the Contingency Theory that was 
developed in the early 1980s by organizational theorists David Nadler and Michael 
Tushman. Nadler and Tushman’s TCM characterizes interactions between processes, 
organizations, personnel, and technologies. This open system modeling approach to 
organization performance can be used to observe inputs and resulting output. The 
introduction of knowledge into the model is a natural fit, as it exhibits a bi-directional flow 
between members of a team, similarly to existing components. The term pathology 
(singular) or pathologies (plural) accurately describes this flow as a phenomenon that both 
effects and is affected by other factors in an organization. As a result of its application, the 
model can detect the sources of performance gap barriers that prevent fundamental change. 
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As a method for contingency planning, TCM can also help organizations observe and 
subsequently function in operationally degraded environments.  
TCM, as with all models, does have limitations. The internal focus on congruence 
may not account for external factors that unevenly affect internal components. 
Furthermore, this model can be used to identify performance inefficiencies but not 
necessarily how to fix any problems that are discovered.  
2. Analysis of TCM Current Concepts  
There are four tenant concepts of The Congruence Model that work in unison: 
processes, organization, personnel, and technologies. Initial application of the model 
enables analysis and understanding of the core work accomplished by an organization’s 
people. The subsequent analysis of critical processes can help identify the factors that 
affects the bi-directional relationships between components. Finding and studying each 
unique challenge can ultimately lead to the discovery of resolutions that solve incongruities 
and improve overall efficiency. The summary of our goal was to understand where the core 
work was being accomplished, by whom, and when. 
3. Congruence Analysis through Behavior Modeling 
The application of TCM provides an effective way to frame the components of an 
organization. However, there are no universal methods to quantitatively measure the 
congruence of those framed components. Monterey Phoenix (MP), a project developed by 
Dr. Mikhail Auguston at the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California, uses 
a high-level, executable language with an event-driven syntax to model complex behaviors 
within a system. The intelligent design of MP combines a code-like event grammar with 
an expressive syntax that can replicate real-world behavior with human readable values. 
MP was chosen to measure and evaluate scope-complete permutations of network 
assessments conducted by CPT personnel. 
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C. CYBER PROTECTION TEAMS  
1. CPT Overview and Mission Focus  
In 2012, the Joint Staff and Commander, United States Cyber Command 
(USCYBERCOM) directed the armed services to build the Cyber Mission Force (CMF), a 
distributed effort consisting of 6,100 joint military personnel operating across 133 cyber 
teams to direct, synchronize, and coordinate cyberspace operations (DOD, 2016). Cyber 
Protection Teams (CPTs), a tactically focused subset of teams collectively referred to as 
the Cyber Protection Force (CPF), were tasked in part with the defense of friendly 
cyberspace networks, data, and capabilities.  
Pursuant to these assigned objectives, CPTs function as a globally distributed layer 
of protection in the DOD’s defense-in-depth strategy. Each CPT is billeted for 39 personnel 
and routinely deploys small 5–7 person teams, called Mission Elements, to perform 
complex network assessments. These assessments determine each surveyed customer’s 
level of defensive posture and preparedness. Subsequent reports provide vital network 
litmus tests to both the customer organization and corresponding cybersecurity providers 
throughout the enterprise (Trent et al., 2019).  
2. Organizational Turnover  
Military services largely share a culture of high workforce turnover due to limited 
tour durations. The average length of time spent on orders at one CPT is 36 months. 
Personnel spend approximately three to six months acclimating to the new team after 
arrival and three months of preparation prior to departure, with the greatest contribution to 
mission and objectives occurring between the two time frames. Over the course of a tour, 
both officer and enlisted personnel focus on one or more areas of defensive network 
analysis. In the context of a CPT, turnover is a term used to describe the process in which 
more experienced personnel relay a wide range of topics about the team that span both 
explicit and tacit knowledge formats. Personnel who arrive as relief (individuals replacing 
departing members who have both the required rank and requisite level of training) for 
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members who have already departed are not offered the opportunity to conduct this 
process.  
3. Protection Teams and Knowledge Context  
Tacit knowledge enables a unique understanding within an organization’s mission 
area. The highly dynamic nature of cyberspace, its impact on stakeholder organizations, 
and relevant information required to operate are inextricably connected. These factors 
affect how knowledge is used to solve domain-specific problems. For example, that 
USCYBERCOM is a functional combatant command is explicit knowledge that can be 
defined, expressed, and understood by a recipient. However, the ability to conduct effective 
cyberspace operations involves a complex mesh of knowledge areas. The heart of this 
research lies within the challenges faced by CPTs which balance both billet manning and 
knowledge retention to execute defensive cyberspace operations. This connection 
ultimately bridges the gap between our study of knowledge and what role it plays in an 
organization. 
D. KNOWLEDGE AS A MEASURABLE PHENOMENON  
The role of knowledge plays a clear and present role in the Cyber Mission Force. 
Despite the action it enables, characteristics of knowledge also make it difficult to 
accurately quantify and capture. This is particularly true regarding tacit knowledge – a fact 
many Protection Teams struggle to reconcile with the rate of personnel turnover. This 
reality highlights a similar challenge to our research as it explored organizational 
congruence, including tacit knowledge as an additional factor for TCM analysis.  
1. Introduction of the Physical World  
The measurement of phenomena in the natural world has long been used as a 
scientific vehicle to understand the processes around us. Returning to Merriam Webster, 
phenomena is defined as: “an object or aspect known through the senses rather than by 
thought or intuition” and “a fact or event of scientific interest susceptible to scientific 
description and explanation” (2021). In the field of physics, energy measures the value that 
must be transferred to an object to perform a unit of work. Moreover, the binary states of 
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potential and kinetic energy subdivide this measurement. Consider a rubber band that is 
stretched. The potential for energy inside the rubber band increases as the band is stretched 
while releasing it converts the potential energy into kinetic movement. Similarly, the 
potential to accomplish work in a team grows as task-relevant knowledge is reflected in 
individual experience. Performing an action represents the transformation into kinetic 
energy as knowledge is used to execute a task.  
An extension of energy, entropy “measures the energy degradation in a natural 
system through increasing disorder” (Andriessen & Bratianu, 2008). Higher values of 
entropy indicate lower values of measurable energy. Entropy can be reduced by introducing 
rigor to a system. A highly organized top-down structure of a Protection Team, for 
example, reduces the entropy values associated with knowledge loss. The human brain is 
significantly less rigid when compared to traditional military organization. Consequently, 
tacit knowledge, largely based on individual experience and subjectivity, naturally exhibits 
higher values of entropy than explicit knowledge. The measurability of energy and entropy 
can help us quantify knowledge and accurately extract its value to an organization. 
2. Connections Between Knowledge and the Physical World  
Although knowledge is difficult to measure through traditional human sensing, it 
“can be observed through the relationship between knowledge and the behaviors associated 
with knowledge” (Simms & Johnson, 2012). Knowledge as a phenomenon in the context 
of a CPT means analyzing not only the outcomes of task-oriented work, but also the 
intangible culture that manifests as a result between team members. Actionability is key in 
this observation. Pfeffer and Sutton highlight that even though “superior [knowledge] 
management practices are reasonably well known, diffusion proceeds slowly and fitfully, 
and backsliding is common” (Pfeffer & Sutton, 1999). The fact that knowledge is critically 
important to organizational success, yet resistant to effective capture is perhaps the greatest 
force driving the use of other domains and disciplines to measure the value of knowledge.  
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III. METHODOLOGY   
This chapter describes the methodology used to frame Cyber Protection Team 
operations for data collection and behavior modeling. The research effort was organized 
and concentrated into three distinct parts:   
1. The Congruence Model was used to frame the internal components of 
CPTs to understand:   
a) The fundamental tasks accomplished in each CPT that underpin the 
event phases of defensive network assessments 
b) How the members of each team complete that work   
3. Anonymous questionnaires, distributed to personnel across three distinct 
demographics were used to identify how tacit knowledge is used to 
accomplish work and how that knowledge is transferred between teams 
and team members. 
4. Monterey Phoenix, an executable, event-driven programming language, 
was used as an iterative, scope-complete behavior modeling platform to 
quantitatively measure tacit knowledge barriers to team personnel in the 
five event phases of network assessments.  
1. The Internal Components of Cyber Protection Teams   
Cyber Protection Teams were designed and staffed with the same institutional 
structure found throughout the U.S. military. Top-down or reverse-pyramid hierarchies, 
one form of many organizational structures, have historical significance when analyzing 
the relationships between members, the work done by these members, and strategic 
direction. Mercer Delta—an asset management and consulting firm—acknowledged this 
precedence, stating the inherent challenges in which “the rapidly accelerating pace of 
change has made that static model obsolete” (Mercer Delta, 1998). The distribution of 
authority in this perspective grants decision-making power to those at the top of an 
organization that disproportionately affect subordinates. As a result, leaders operating in 
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this paradigm my not fully understand the full effect of those decisions on subordinate 
members. Although CPTs fall within the military Cyber Mission Force structure, the team-
of-teams Mission Element approach to network assessments and the range of expertise on 
each team indicate nuanced organizational details. This research categorized CPTs into the 
three in-scope components that coexist to form the transformation process at the heart of 
TCM:  
• its people  
• the work they do 
• the formal structure  
2. Scope   
Two research questions were developed to understand tacit knowledge and how it 
affects an organization:  
1. How does the inclusion of tacit knowledge into The Congruence Model 
impact the model’s determination of organizational fit and performance?  
2.  How can tacit knowledge be measured within the Cyber Protection Team’s 
as a method to test its inclusion into The Congruence Model?  
With the understanding that tacit knowledge enables action and “no practical 
organization can function without the individuals and groups of people in it,” (Nissen, 
2014) the methods of this research focused on CPT operators (the people) and network 
assessments (the work) they perform. By design, the culture component of TCM was 
excluded from the scope of this research to limit complexity during behavioral modeling 
discussed later in this chapter.  
Network assessments are the primary mission focus for CPTs. Given the dynamic 
and complex nature of these networks, actionable knowledge enables each Mission 
Element to successfully navigate the customer-evaluator relationship from start to finish. 
This knowledge-rich environment became the focal point our research. The assessment 
process was divided into five event phases with corresponding event actors as referenced 
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in Table 1. Clearly defined event phases and actors allowed us to isolate the relevant TCM 
components for each pathology in order to test and observe the resulting behavior in the 
form of MP event traces. The use of “event” for each segment in the assessment process 
was intentional and is discussed later in this chapter with Monterey Phoenix.  
Table 1. CPT Network Assessment Events and Assessment Personnel  
  Assessment Personnel 
Assessment Events Team Lead  Cyber Planner  
Mission 






Assessment Scheduling  g      x              
Initial Site Survey g    x  x  x       
Assessment Planning & Staffing g   x  x     x     
Assessment Execution g       x     x  x  
Post-Assessment Action g   x        x     
♦Selected based on assessment requirements from a Site-Survey 
♦♦Advisory role to the Team Lead and Mission Element Lead 
 
B. ANONYMOUS QUESTIONNAIRES   
1. TCM and CPTs: The Connective Tissue   
The role of CPTs as defensive cyberspace assessors in the Cyber Mission Force is 
largely stable and has not changed since the CPT’s inception in 2010. While the 
composition of networks can differ among organizations and even operational theaters, 
mission objectives are team-agnostic across the Cyber Protection Force. Individual 
members, however, contribute to this mission with unique tacit knowledge, individually 
shaped by personal experience. Questionnaires were developed and distributed to 
personnel with a wide range of experience and paygrade across five Pacific Theater CPTs 
to gather qualitative feedback. The teams and their geographic locations are listed in Table 
2. The questionnaire process and member input were conducted anonymously, 
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communicating through two senior enlisted leaders who serve as operational managers for 
the teams. Names or personal information were excluded from the data collection process 
to prevent attribution for any participant.   
Table 2. CPT Sample Frame 
CPT Sample Frame  
Team Name  Geographic Location  
500 CPT  Oahu, Hawaii  
501 CPT  Oahu, Hawaii  
502 CPT  Oahu, Hawaii  
551 CPT  Oahu, Hawaii  
553 CPT  San Diego, California  
 
2. Questionnaire Composition   
A total of nine questions, as seen in Figure 3, were designed to reveal the 
connections between CPT personnel and the work they perform as modeled with TCM. 
The questions prompted team members for input regarding (1) the objectives of CPT 
operations from the team member point of view, (2) the formal training pipelines that 
prepare personnel for CPT billets, (3) the use of both formal and tacit knowledge to 
prosecute objectives, and (4) the methods CPTs use to transfer knowledge between 
personnel to include on-the-job training, turnover processes, and lessons learned. All four 
question categories used in this research were designed to target core areas where the use 
of tacit knowledge was likely to affect organization performance. Identifying member 
experiences in these areas informed our understanding of the influence and constraints of 





Figure 3. CPT Personnel Questionnaire  
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C. MONTEREY PHOENIX BEHAVIOR MODELING   
1. An Introduction to Monterey Phoenix   
To answer the second research question regarding the measurement of tacit 
knowledge within CPTs, the research methodology used Monterey Phoenix (MP) to model 
behaviors of CPT personnel during network assessments. Monterey Phoenix, A project 
developed by Dr. Mikhail Auguston at the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, 
California, uses a high-level, executable language with an event-driven syntax to model 
complex behaviors within a system. Words appearing IN THIS FORMAT will reference MP-
specific terms and keywords used within the platform’s source code. Network assessments 
and relevant assessment stakeholders were mapped to models that were then executed in 
the MP environment to observe scope-complete behavior representing the work that 
underpins the entire assessment process. 
2. Modeling the Protection Teams   
All events in a single model are organized into one SCHEMA with each event defined 
as a child to the SCHEMA in its own unique ROOT scope with associated characteristics. For 
example, site surveys of a network are defined as a ROOT event under the 
Network_Assessment SCHEMA, must PRECEDE the Assessment_Preparation ROOT event, 
but INCLUDE vital steps such as  completing target Network_characterization 
and Survey_coordination with the customer organization. Source code used to translate 
CPT assessments into Monterey Phoenix events is described in Chapter IV and displayed 
in Appendices A–C. Executing defined models in MP result in one or more traces—the 
term used in Monterey Phoenix to describe one permutation of possible output—per model. 
Trace outputs from each executed model were analyzed to characterize the quantitative 





The findings in this chapter are a result of our three-stage analysis. The first stage 
of analysis describes how Cyber Protection Teams were framed with The Congruence 
Model to understand the role of internal components and their bi-directional interaction. 
The second stage discusses how respondent answers, gathered via questionnaires, were 
categorized and distilled into seven distinct tacit knowledge flows. The term pathology 
(singular) or pathologies (plural) will be used in this chapter to identify the transfer of 
knowledge from one internal component to another. The final stage of analysis describes 
how the identified components of CPTs were overlaid with the seven discovered 
pathologies to produce executable code for Monterey Phoenix that resulted in iterative, 
scope-complete behavior models. 
A. FRAMING NETWORK ASSESSMENT EVENT PHASES 
As summarized in Chapter II, The Congruence Model provides a flexible method 
to frame an organization into three related pieces that affect overall congruence: 
• Input to the organization including external environmental factors or 
forces applied from other organizations / people. 
• Internal components in a meshed symbiosis of people, work, structure, 
and culture as key drivers of performance. 
• Output from the organization as a result of the internal components 
working together to operate on the received input. 
This system of systems model reflects the interconnectedness between components 
where a change in one affect one or more pieces of the organization. Our sample frame was 
modeled using a modified approach to TCM, visually captured in Figure 4 with a focus on 
the internal components of work, people, and structure. The input, output and culture were 
excluded from our research to focus on the internal presence and flow of tacit knowledge 
within each team. Analysis was conducted on real-world pathologies that develop between 
CPT personnel, the work they do, and the structure in which they operate. These 
22 
components collectively affect team congruence throughout every phase of a network 
assessment. 
 
Figure 4. The Scoped Components of The Congruence Model 
Initial analysis identified the elements of Protection Teams and mission areas that 
translate to TCM core components. This translation can be seen in Table 3 along with a 
summary list of each pertinent component. 
Table 3. TCM Model Component Translation to Cyber Protection Teams 
TCM Component Related CPT Component Component Examples 
The People Relevant stakeholders in the network assessment process  
Team Lead 
Mission Element Lead 
Cyber Planner 
Mission Element Operators 
External Stakeholders 
 
The Work CPT Network Assessments and administrative reporting 
Five phase-network assessments  
After-Action Reports 
 




1. The People: Network Assessment Stakeholders
Tacit knowledge, as described in Chapter II, is a phenomenon that occurs in and 
between the people of an organization. As a key component in the context of both TCM 
and defensive cyberspace assessments, CPT work roles were analyzed using Job 
Qualification Requirement (JQRs) documents—work role-specific training support that 
guides each team member’s explicit and tacit knowledge development while with a team – 
to identify how and where each fit into the overall organization. A summary of key 
stakeholders is listed below. 
Internal CPT Personnel 
• CPT Team Lead (Abbreviated as TL): Individuals who function as the
primary connective tissue between the operators who conduct the
assessment, the assessment itself, and the Protection Team’s highest-
ranking officer, or Officer in Charge (OIC). The level of coordination and
interaction with superior commands / ranking officials—such as higher
headquarters, government officials, joint military organizations, and
multinational partners—necessitates the fulfillment of these work roles by
officers (“JQR for DCO Team Lead Basic,” p. 2).
• CPT Mission Element Lead (Abbreviated as ME Lead or MEL):
Individuals appointed on a per-mission basis to provide tactical, first-line
leadership to Mission Element operators before, during, and after the
assessment process. This work role is considerably more flexible than that
of the TL, where practical experience and qualification status are
considered equal factors to paygrade. This flexibility enables a dynamic
range of eligible personnel to fulfill this role from E-6 through O-2.
• CPT Cyber Planner: Individuals who perform vital functions throughout
the assessment process which involve coordination with CPT leadership /
higher headquarters elements, tracking and planning Future Operations
(FOPS), and Current Operations (COPS) support to activated ME teams.
Members filling the Cyber Planner work role are typically experienced in
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two or more CMF work roles across both defensive and offensive 
missions sets (“JQR for DCO Planner Basic,” p. 3). 
• CPT Mission Element Operators: Individuals who staff the five to seven 
person Mission Elements on a per-assessment basis; this number can rise 
or fall depending on the size of a target network. Operators constitute the 
majority of a CPT’s 39 total positions and collectively represent a wide 
range of skills and experience. In ideal circumstances, each Mission 
Element is staffed with Operators who have skillsets that correspond to the 
results and recommendations of a network’s site-survey.  
External Stakeholders 
• Commander, Operational Higher Headquarters: CPTs were developed as 
small, tactical teams without designation as a standalone military 
command. A superior commander exercises Operational Control 
(OPCON)—the authority exercised by a military commander to direct 
mission-related tasking for subordinate units—of Protection Teams within 
a defined Area of Responsibility (AOR), interfacing with CPT leadership / 
planning staff to delegate mission planning and requirements. 
• Mission Owner: The individual within a customer organization designated 
as the primary point of contact for the duration of a CPT assessment, with 
most interaction occurring during the Site-Survey and Assessment 
Execution phases described in the next section. 
• Program of Record Owner: The primary point of contact for a Program of 
Record (POR) whose assets reside on a customer’s internal network. 
These tenant programs typically provide unique capabilities to one or 
more organizations and can introduce additional requirements for the Site-
Survey team. POR Owners are functionally subordinate to the Mission 
Owner over the span of network assessments event phases. 
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2. The Work: CPT-Customer Network Assessments 
Performing network assessments constitute one of the primary Protection Team 
mission focus areas. The modular nature in which Mission Elements are staffed and 
deployed requires a level of autonomy backstopped by actionable knowledge. These 
characteristics made the process a prime candidate to analyze the presence, flow, and effect 
of knowledge flow pathologies. The assessment process was subsequently mapped to five 
self-contained event phases, as seen in Figure 5. In some cases, Efforts within some event 
phases can be concurrently completed but each occurs sequentially without condition. This 
linear mapping enabled MP logic to reflect the tacit knowledge relationships between ROOT 
events in terms of positive and negative reinforcement. The five event phase are listed 
below with the associated milestones for each. 
 
Figure 5. The Five Event Phases of CPT a Network 
Assessment 
• Future Operations Assessment Tracking: The first event phase involves 
tracking, planning, and scheduling of customer organizations in the CPT’s 
respective AOR. Cyber Planners, working closely alongside senior team 
leadership, coordinate with higher headquarters staff to properly space 
assessment timelines throughout a given year. An assessment enters the 
next event phase (Customer Site-Survey) approximately 90 days from the 
scheduled execution window. Team Leads and Mission Element Leads are 
normally selected before the next event phase milestone elapses. 
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• Customer Site-Survey: In the second phase, site-survey members, TL, 
MEL, Cyber Planner, and one to two operators, serving as technical 
advisors, travel to the customer’s geographic area to establish contact with 
the Mission Owner and discuss assessment requirements. Factors in this 
discovery include but are not limited to identifying the number of 
networks to assess, classification level of each network, and type / number 
of devices residing on each network. Requirements gathered during this 
step are crucial and provide the foundation for all subsequent event 
phases. 
• Assessment Preparation: Upon the return of the survey team, the 
Assessment Preparation event phase begins and is characterized by three 
main efforts: Mission Element staffing, tool testing and preparation, and 
administrative overhead as defined by the higher headquarters. Mission 
Element Operators are selected from the pool of available personnel based 
on surveyed requirements and individual qualification status. The ideal 
ME is staffed with an even mixture of experienced and inexperienced 
Operators in order to facilitate OJT and mentorship from the former to the 
latter. Once assembled, the ME then gathers and tests the requisite number 
of Deployable Mission Support System (DMSS) kits that will be used to 
perform on-site network collection during the fourth event phase 
(Assessment Execution). The Concept of Operations (CONOP) is 
concurrently drafted by CPT team leadership which codifies the 
operational aspects of each assessment as well as the relevant roles for 
each stakeholder in the assessment. A CONOP is ultimately signed by the 
higher headquarters commander, CPT OIC, and Mission Owner before 
each assessment execution can begin. 
• Assessment Execution: Mission Elements depart for the assessment site 
to execute the fourth event phase once the team is prepared and CONOP 
has been signed. Operators systematically retest the DMSS kits upon 
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arrival to check for damaged or inoperable components. Pending gear 
status, the ME installs network hardware and begins the data collection 
process which typically last between two to four weeks. Once complete, 
the ME disconnects network hardware, returns home, and uploads the data 
to a lab environment where it is then analyzed for after-action reporting. 
• Analysis and After-Action Reporting: The network assessment
transitions to the final event phase begins when the ME returns home,
unpacks the DMSS kits, and transfers collected data to the CPT lab
environment for analysis. Team operators review the customer’s data
comparing the findings to the network’s established baseline to uncover
anomalies. The analysis is distilled into an After-Action Report (AAR)
document which is distributed to CPT leadership and customer via the
Mission Owner. The TL and MEL conclude the network assessment by
collecting Lessons Learned (LL) from the Mission Element that can be
used to improve future missions for the team.
3. The Structure: CPT Chain of Command and Operational
Relationships
As military organizations, Cyber Protection Teams naturally operate in a highly 
rigid environment. A majority of network assessments conducted by CPTs are cyclic in 
nature and constitute one of the many DOD policy requirements for tenant organizations 
to remain active in the global digital enterprise. The supported and supporting relationships 
between a team’s higher headquarters commander, and even the assessed customers, are 
bounded by the concept of authorities in Title 10 doctrine (i.e., applies to all services and 
not limited to one military branch). The relevant authorities in network assessments are 
listed below. 
• Operational Control (OPCON): The functional authority of a
commander to organize and employ military forces to accomplish an
assigned task or objective. OPCON of a force can be associated with
“getting the job done” but does not necessarily include the administrative,
28 
logistical, or training support to execute a commander’s intent (U.S. 
Army, 2016). The sample frame of CPTs in this research are operationally 
controlled by the Pacific Task Group Commander in the 
USINDOPACOM AOR. 
• Administrative Control (ADCON): The functional authority of a 
commander to carry out the administrative support needed to sustain a 
military unit. Associated tasks with this authority can include the 
fulfillment of Manning, Training, and Equipping (MTE) requirements to 
maintain force readiness. Parent units who temporarily transfer OPCON to 
another commander will retain ADCON authority, a circumstance in 
which subordinate units maintain separate chains of command between 
operational and administrative support. 
B. TACIT KNOWLEDGE PATHOLOGIES 
With internal components of people, work, and structure defined, inputs returned 
from personnel within the sampled CPTs were analyzed to identify the flow and 
characteristics of tacit knowledge pathologies. A total of fourteen questionnaires were 
returned from five teams – four stationed in Oahu, Hawaii and one stationed in San Diego, 
California. With the support from two senior enlisted leaders from the sampled teams, three 
distinct paygrade groups anonymously contributed responses in support of the research 
effort. The ranges and categories of respondent paygrades are identified in Table 4. 
Table 4. Questionnaire Respondent Paygrade Demographics 
Respondent Paygrade Demographics 
Group Identifier Paygrade Range Group Size 
Junior Enlisted Personnel E-1 – E-6 8 
Senior Enlisted Personnel E-7 – E-9 5 
Officer Personnel O-1 – O-3 1 
Total: 14 
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Each of the nine questionnaire prompts were carefully developed to enhance our 
understanding of what kinds of tacit knowledge, or “know how” knowledge, manifested 
for the personnel involved in real-world operations. The responses from each member were 
digested in a two-part process to analyze emergent pathologies in the context of a CPT’s 
congruence factors. 
• Initial respondent review. All nine respondent questions were carefully
analyzed and collated into one document for each team. Grouping data by
team helped us identify trends that were generally consistent across a team
to avoid individual outliers that could asymmetrically impact the behavior
modeling process.
• Congruence factor correlation. A table was prepared with five column
keys to contextualize the distilled input from team members. The first
column was configured with a selectable dropdown field with five options
to match the event phase of a network assessment. The second and third
columns were labeled as “Actor” and “Recipient” respectively and
configured with a second dropdown field containing “The People,” “The
Work,” and “The Structure” options to reflect the bi-directional, cause and
effect relationships of TCM internal components. A fourth column was
labeled as “Source” and configured with a dropdown containing
“Questionnaire,” “JQR,” and “Combination” options to identify where the
source or sources of data were coming from. A fifth and final
“Description” column captured free-form text to describe useful
information concerning each row of the table. Figure 6—a custom image
developed from our intermediate correlation table and wireframe flow-
chart—captures the expanded dropdowns to show options that functioned
as connective tissue between respondent answers and a particular
pathology’s anatomy. A total of seven individual pathologies emerged
from our analysis across all five teams. The final results of the correlation
can be seen in Table 5 along with an abbreviated description of each trend.
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Figure 6. Correlation Table and Corresponding Questionnaire 
Questions 
Table 5. Mapping Respondent Answers to TCM Components and 
Assessment Event Phases 
Respondent Input / TCM Component / Event Phase Mapping 
# Event Phase Actor → Affected Description 
1 Phase 3: Preparation People → Work 
In some circumstances, qualified team members are not 
always available to sign line items in the JQR of newly 
onboarded members; members in this situation are often not 
fully prepared or qualified for their assigned CPT work role. 
2 Phase 3: Preparation Structure → People 
Billeted operators do not always receive an equal or adequate 
level of pipeline training prior to onboarding OR operators 
do not have a reliable method or codified process to transfer 
actionable knowledge to newly onboarded members. 
3 Phase 3: Preparation Structure → Work 
Much of an operator’s “know-how” knowledge is gathered 
during on-site assessments; experienced operators are often 
the first choice for ME staffing, reducing exposure 
opportunities for less experienced team members to build 
tacit knowledge. 
4 Phase 2: Site-Survey People → Work 
A lack of experience by the Site-Survey team members 
results in miscommunication and inaccurate assessment 
requirement development, hindering operator execution in 
later event phases. 
5 Phase 3: Preparation Structure → Work 
There is no standardized method for accomplishing the event 
phases of a network assessment across the CPF; members 
who transfer from one CPT to another often find that their 
hard-earned, actionable knowledge is minimized and must 
readjust to a new team’s workflow to regain lost execution 
efficiency. 
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Respondent Input / TCM Component / Event Phase Mapping 
# Event Phase Actor → Affected Description 
6 Phase 4: Execution People → Work 
Operators occasionally feel pressured to perform “rushed” 
assessments without the specialized / necessary tools; as a 
result, operators are not always able to hone analytical skills 
and often produce after-action reports with very little impact. 
7 Phase 5: After-Action Work → People 
Some of the most valuable Lessons Learned (LL) stem from 
vulnerable or misconfigured networks; however, LL are 
sometimes written to reflect limited fault on the customer’s 
behalf; valuable opportunities for individual / team tacit 
knowledge improvement are lost when messaging is 
prioritized over accurate LL. 
 
C. BEHAVIOR MODELING 
1. Model Design 
Event modeling of the network assessment event phases was accomplished using 
the MP-Firebird tool, a web-based integrated development environment for Monterey 
Phoenix that supports syntax highlighting and code execution. MP’s modeling paradigm is 
flexible enough to replicate a wide possibility of scenarios that occur in the physical world. 
In the case of real-world network assessments, two separate models were developed to 
capture the internal relationships between CPT components. Appendix A contains the 
readable MP source code for the baseline model and the combination of Appendices B and 
C (note the continuity of line numbering from Appendix B to Appendix C) contain the MP 
source code for the pathology model. Semantically, both models contain identical 
namespaces for root actors, event phases, precedence; however, our models deviate where 
actors exhibit behavioral differences as a result of additional Boolean characteristics. The 
remainder of this chapter refers to first model as the “baseline model” and second as the 
“pathology model.” Six event grammar keywords and one language feature were used to 
replicate scope-complete permutations of network assessments. 
• SCHEMA: A unique keyword used at the root (occurring first) of a MP 
source code file, serving as the parent object under which all subsequent 
event grammar belongs. The first and second model schemas were defined 
as Network_Assessment_Baseline and 
Network_Assessment_Pathology_Overlay, respectively. 
32 
• ROOT: Uniquely named keyword used to define the primary event 
components of a model. Each root declaration is used to group together 
characteristics that collectively describe its behavior in a SCHEMA’s model. 
Five event phases and four event actors were defined for both models 
addressed in this research. 
• COORDINATE → DO: Keyword combination used for composition 
operations that “coordinate” behavior(s) between two or more root events. 
This operation was used to correlate the characteristics of each actor to 
key points across relevant event phases. 
• IF → THEN → DO: Keyword combination used to test branching behavior 
as a result of conditional logic. These keywords were extensively used in 
the second model to test the result of an actor’s Boolean characteristics. 
• REPORT → CLEAR → SAY → SHOW: Keyword combination used to 
visually display pathology match statistics for a given test by defining a 
unique report name (REPORT), clearing any polluted statistics from a 
variable (CLEAR), formatting a message’s contents (SAY), then printing a 
message (SHOW) in the IDE’s graphed output. 
• /* Code Block Comment */: Human readable, non-executable feature 
of the Monterey Phoenix language that begins with a leading /* and ends 
with a trailing */. Referred to as “commenting” or “commenting out” in 
this research, these characters are used in the IDE’s code editor to either 
(1) record in-line documentation for a block of code or (2) stop a block of 
code from executing at runtime as a means to control model behavior. 
The baseline model reflected the ideal state of CPT components in which team 
members are fully qualified and event phases are unconditionally completed. Assessment 
actors were defined with static, non-branching characteristics such as 
“Training_complete” and “Familiar_with_workflow” that intentionally 
abstracted away adverse team performance. Beyond event phases and actors, the first 
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model established a baseline representation network assessment, using only four 
COORDINATE statements to set event phase precedence. (e.g., the Site-Survey event phase 
precedes the Assessment Preparation event phase). Execution of the first model at a scope 
level of 1 without additional relationships or opportunities for branch behavior resulted in 
exactly one trace result. 
2. Pathology Analysis 
The second model extended the baseline with conditional logic to reflect the 
distilled answers from questionnaire respondents. Specifically, the pathology model 
differed from the baseline model in two important ways: 
1. Behaviors for each event phase actor were converted from static fields to 
Boolean case values. These changes created realistic scenarios in which 
tacit knowledge barriers hinge on a team member’s personal attributes or 
the attributes of others. For example, Mission Element Operators who 
encounter issues with training or JQR completion may have divergent 
outcomes from peers who do not encounter these barriers at all. 
2 Additional COORDINATE statements were added to associate the Boolean 
conditions of event actors to strategic points in the network assessment 
process. These conditional relationships recreate the experiences of CPT 
personnel represented in questionnaire responses. 
Seven unique pathologies—captured in Table 6—were constructed to test the 
outcome of added Boolean behavior characteristics and coordinated relationships. 
Unmodified execution of the pathology model—i.e., without excluding event actors from 
specific pathology tests via code comment blocks—resulted in 512 unique traces— 
reflecting a high degree of potential variance throughout an assessment. Code block 
comments were used to temporarily exclude event actors from tests who did not have 
characteristics that affected a given pathology’s logic at runtime. Figure 7 captures an 
example of these comments around the TeamLead, CyberPlanner, and MELead event 
actors to exclude the root events from the Pathology 1 logic test starting on line 66. 
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Table 6. Table of Constructed Pathologies 
Table of Constructed Pathologies 
Name Event Actor(s) Event Phase 
Pathology 1 Mission Element Operators 4 | Assessment Execution 
Pathology 2 Mission Element Operators 3 | Assessment Preparation 
Pathology 3 
Team Lead 
Mission Element Operators 
 





2 | Site-Survey 
Pathology 5 
Mission Element Lead 
Mission Element Operators 
 
3 | Assessment Preparation 
Pathology 6 Mission Element Lead 4 | Assessment Execution 
Pathology 7 Mission Element Lead 5 | Analysis and AAR 
 
Figure 7. Excluding Event Actors with Code Comment 
Characters. 
Analysis for each of the seven pathologies is listed below and reflected in Figures 
8 through 14. Each pathology’s associated number corresponds to the same numbers shown 
previously in Table 5. The scope for each pathology was set to a value of 1 to limit trace 
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output complexity between event phases and actors. Trace results from each pathology 
were analyzed for the presence of positive reinforcement which, if uncorrected, could 
indicate negative or unwanted inefficiencies in the network assessment process. 
Table 7. Pathology Model Execution Results 
Model Execution Results 
Root Event Actors ROOT Name Traces Events 
Team Lead TeamLeaad 2 4 
Cyber Planner CyberPlannner 2 4 
Mission Element Lead MELead 8 32 
Mission Element Operator MEOperator 32 192 
Event Actor Totals 44 232 
 
Root Event Phases ROOT Name Traces Events 
Assessment Tracking TrackingEventPhase 1 3 
Site-Survey SiteSurveyEventPhaase 5 18 
Assessment Preparation PreparationEventPhase 1 6 
Assessment Execution ExecutionEventPhase 1 4 
Analysis & After-Action 
Reporting AnalysisAAREventPhase 1 5 
Event Phase Totals 9 36 
 
 
Pathology 1 | Training pipeline and JQR Completion 
• Event actor: Mission Element Operators 
• Event Phase: Assessment Execution 
• Summary & Analysis: An ME Operator encounters barrier(s) to Tacit 
Knowledge (TK) development when he or she has not had the opportunity 
to complete the codified training pipeline and when senior team members 
are not available / cannot support JQR completion. Model execution with 
only the ME Operator enabled resulted in 32 unique traces with five traces 
(15.6%) exhibiting compound TK barriers. Nested logic successfully 
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captured possible scenarios where both training and qualification status 
inefficiencies could impact an operator’s ability for team contribution via 
tacit knowledge. 
 
Figure 8. Pathology 1 Trace Result 
Pathology 2 | Unstructured Opportunities for Turnover  
• Event Actor: Mission Element Operators 
• Event Phase: Assessment Preparation 
• Summary & Analysis: Tacit knowledge barriers develop for CPT 
personnel when departing and arriving members encounter unstructured 
opportunities for turnover, lengthening the amount of time required to 
become fully integrated into team workflows. While this barrier is not 
limited to one work role, the ME Operator was used to represent CPT 
personnel as a whole and could easily be exchanged with another role. 
Two separate logic tests (2a and 2b) were developed to detect scenarios in 
which arriving members do not have the opportunity to conduct turnover 
and (2a) have not completed the training pipeline or (2b) have not yet 
completed the work role JQR. Model execution with only the ME 
Operator enabled resulted in 32 unique traces exhibiting TK barriers in 
pathology 2a with four traces (12.5%), pathology 2b with four traces 
(12.5%), and presence of both pathologies with four traces (12.5%). The 
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benefit of scope-complete modeling is evident in this result, capturing 
both cases as well as overlap where unmitigated barriers in training / 
qualification (TCM: structure) are compounded with barriers in turnover 
(TCM: people). 
 
Figure 9. Pathology 2 Trace Result 
Pathology 3 | Unbalanced Mission Element Staffing 
• Event Actors: Team Lead, Mission Element Operator 
• Event Phase: Assessment Preparation 
• Summary & Analysis: Questionnaire respondents identified hands-on 
training during assessment event phases as one of the most valuable 
resources for tacit knowledge development on a CPT. As a result, 
Operators encounter tacit knowledge barriers when not selected for 
Mission Element staffing in the preparation event phase. Model execution 
with only the TL (staff selector) and ME Operator (potential staff selectee) 
enabled resulted in 64 unique event traces with five traces (7.8%) 
matching pathology 3 conditions. Interestingly, the addition of a Team 
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Lead effectively doubled the trace count (possible permutations) while 
concurrently reducing instances of positive reinforcement. Figure 10 
captures this scenario in which no relationship exists between the Team 
Lead, appointed during the first event phase, and Operator who is not 
selected for the ME in the third event phase. Analysis revealed an 
unexpected causal relationship between the first, second, and third 
pathologies in which barriers to tacit knowledge are compounded when 
issues occur in two or more consecutive event phases. 
 
Figure 10. Pathology 3 Trace Result 
Pathology 4 | Site-Survey Team Experience 
• Event Actors: Team Lead, Cyber Planner 
• Event Phase: Site-Survey 
• Summary & Analysis: Site-Surveys are integral to the assessment process 
as subsequent event phases cascade from requirements identified in this 
step. Team Leads and Cyber Planners who encounter tacit knowledge 
barriers during a survey, be it administrative experience or technical 
proficiency, impact Mission Elements in the third, fourth, and fifth event 
phases. Logic was written to identify branch scenarios where limited 
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experience for both actors were present. Model execution with only the TL 
and Cyber Planner roles enabled resulted in four unique traces with one 
trace (25%) exhibiting a TK barrier. Although positive reinforcement only 
appeared once, the influence of surveys on other event phases cannot be 
ignored. 
 
Figure 11. Pathology 4 Trace Result 
Pathology 5 | Inter-CPT Workflow Continuity 
• Event Actors: Mission Element Lead, Mission Element Operator 
• Event Phase: Assessment Preparation 
• Summary & Analysis: Unstructured assessment patterns across the CPF 
introduce tacit knowledge barriers when team members depart from one 
CPT and arrive at another, only to find unfamiliar workflows that inhibit 
efficiency. Model execution with only the MEL and ME Operator enabled 
resulted in 128 unique traces with 32 traces (25%) exhibiting TK barriers. 
As heavy lifters in the assessment process, ME Leads and ME Operators 
exhibit characteristics that interface with several event phases. Figure 12 
captures tasks associated with preparation that require unfamiliar members 
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to focus on task semantics before actionable knowledge can be 
reconstituted. 
 
Figure 12. Pathology 5 Trace Result 
Pathology 6 | Accelerated Assessment Execution 
• Event Actors: Mission Element Lead 
• Event Phases: Assessment Execution 
• Summary & Analysis: As the senior team member and appointed 
supervisor, Mission Element Leads travel with operators to the customer 
site and oversee data collection that feeds after-action reporting. In some 
cases, operational factors require a compressed execution window which 
in turn causes the ME Lead to modify the actionable tasks for his or her 
team. Test logic for this pathology was developed with the intent to 
capture heuristic patterns that develop into tacit knowledge barriers over a 
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period of time. Model execution with only the MEL enabled resulted in 
four traces (50%) exhibiting TK barriers. Although MEs do encounter 
compressed windows, the number of traces exhibiting positive 
reinforcement are artificially high when compared to questionnaire 
respondent answers.  
 
Figure 13. Pathology 6 Trace Result 
• Pathology 7 | Input Sources for Lessons Learned 
• Event Actor: Mission Element Leads 
• Event Phase: Analysis and After-Action Reporting 
• Summary & Analysis: The development of lessons learned following an 
operation act as a feedback loop, identifying areas for improvement in 
both preparation and execution phases. In some cases, lessons learned are 
framed in a way that insulates a customer from the results of its own 
assessment. Mission Elements that encounter this form of tacit knowledge 
barrier develop heuristic trends over time and cannot fully capitalize on 
the opportunities to improve actionable knowledge. Model execution with 
only the MEL enabled resulted in four traces (50%) exhibiting TK 
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barriers. As with pathology 6, this level of positive reinforcement is 
artificially high when compared to respondent answers. 
 
Figure 14. Pathology 7 Trace Result 
D. SUMMARY 
Figure 15 visually represents the seven tacit knowledge pathologies that overlay 
CPT network assessments. Each event phase has been color coded and linked to its 
associated knowledge flow. Individual pathologies are displayed as boxes with the acting 
component, affected component, and direction of affect flow. Numbers for each pathology 
in the figure correspond to respondent answers in Table 5 listed previously. The forward 
arrows (blue / green / yellow arrows originating left and flowing right) represent the 
presence of tacit knowledge barriers that affect CPT congruence within the life cycle one 
network assessment. The reverse arrows (red / purple arrows originating right and flowing 





Figure 15. Network Assessment Event Phases and Tacit Knowledge Pathology Overlay 
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To answer the first research question—how does the inclusion of tacit knowledge 
into The Congruence Model impact the model’s determination of organizational fit and 
performance?— the inclusion of tacit knowledge as factor for congruence exposes unique, 
intra-component pathologies that could have been overlooked were people, work, and 
structure the only factors to be analyzed. Moreover, the use of quantitative modeling via 
Monterey Phoenix highlighted several cases where the presence of two or more barriers 
produced compound positive reinforcement for multiple team members across two or more 
event phases. 
To answer the second research question—how can tacit knowledge be measured 
within the Cyber Protection Teams as a method to test its inclusion into The Congruence 
Model?—applying a combination of qualitative data collection (CPT personnel 
questionnaires) and quantitative analysis (trace results from Monterey Phoenix model 
execution) proved to be an effective way to test for the presence and impact of tacit 
knowledge barriers that inhibit organization efficiency. The expressive MP event grammar 
was easily mapped to CPT-specific components and produced event traces that could be 





V. CONCLUSION  
This chapter concludes the body of research with a presentation of 
recommendations, study limitations, and promising areas for future research. As addressed 
in Chapter II, the actionable nature of tacit knowledge makes it an extremely valuable 
component of any organization. This is equally true regarding the teams that compile the 
Cyber Protection Force who rely on cyberspace workforce professionals to execute 
defensive mission across the globe. The characteristics that make tacit knowledge (a 
resource internalized by each person of a team to accomplish complex tasks with intangible 
context) valuable also make it difficult to codify, capture, and maintain with high rates of 
personnel turnover. The results captured in this work present the value of actionable 
knowledge not just for the CPF, but for organizations across the Title 10 Cyber Mission 
Force enterprise.  
A. RECOMMENDATIONS  
1. Congruence Analysis Using All Components of TCM 
The work accomplished in this research—combining The Congruence Model with 
Monterey Phoenix to enable programmatic, scope-complete behavior modeling—is a 
positive move toward a better understanding of not only knowledge, but how knowledge 
affects the U.S. military’s cybersecurity workforce. Future research in this area should 
strive to use all four core factors of TCM to determine organization congruence and / or 
behavior modeling. 
2. Monterey Phoenix Behavior Modeling  
The executable event grammar found in Monterey Phoenix is extremely flexible 
and should be considered for future bodies of research that include event and / or behavior 
modeling. Several data points in our research came directly from real-world operators with 
first-hand experience about the network assessment process from five separate 
organization perspectives. Qualitative collection from our sample frame produced positive 
and negative data points, both of which were instrumental in our search for tacit knowledge 
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pathologies. This flexible event grammar is displayed in Figure 16 which visualizes the 
Boolean characteristics for Mission Element Operators and corresponding test for members 
who have completed training pipelines / qualification requirements (negative 
reinforcement) and those who have not (positive reinforcement).  
 
Figure 16. ME Operator Characteristics and Corresponding 
Pathology  
3. Measurable Value Mapping.  
Research involving behavioral modeling and analysis—using Monterey Phoenix or 
equivalent platform—should develop methods to apply weighted values for wanted and 
unwanted outcomes. Using the assessment execution event phase as an example, binary 
yes / no branches are a valid way to introduce scenarios where a Mission Element is missing 
one network cable vice an entire DMSS kit; however, these are not circumstances with 
equal impact. Network cables can easily be replaced whereas each DMSS kit is an integral 
part of the assessment process. Model relationships should be configured to expose 
pathology logic that reflects realistic, real-world cause and affect scenarios.  
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4. Cyber Mission Force Application  
The approach used in this research to model operational aspects of the CPF should 
be adapted and applied to other team and communities in the Cyber Mission Force. Beyond 
tacit knowledge pathologies, team input and relational modeling proved to be an effective 
process for identifying, building, and executing scope-complete models that reflected 
realistic operational scenarios. Figure 17 visualizes the notable discovery of tacit 
knowledge barriers in accelerated assessment timelines and AAR lessons learned 
development of that heuristically affect tacit knowledge and team congruence over the 
course of several network assessments. Operational units across the CMF – Joint Force 
Headquarters-Cyber units, tactically-focused offensive Cyber Mission Teams and National 
Mission Teams, and corresponding support teams – can use the approach trailblazed in this 




Figure 17. Phases 3 through 5  
B. LIMITATIONS  
This study was a focused application of The Congruence Model to discover and 
subsequently measure tacit knowledge pathologies in the network assessment process of 
Cyber Protection Teams. Although this research was guided by thorough planning and 
diligent execution, some issues did arise that affected our work. The points listed below 
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capture our own lessons learned and should be taken into consideration for future research 
efforts.  
1.  We anticipated the restrictions of face-to-face interviews and government 
travel limitations due to the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic. These 
restrictions on physical contact during the questionnaire process and the 
original intent to hold in-person focus groups affected our ability to gather 
first-hand data collection in the day-to-day operations and training cycles of 
the teams  
2. There is no assembled collection of literature that addresses either tacit 
knowledge or tacit knowledge management regarding CPTs or any Cyber 
Mission Force component for that matter. Although anticipated, this 
presented significant hurtles during the initial research and experimentation 
development phases.  
3. Although the USINDOPACOM AOR includes a significant portion of the 
U.S. military’s cybersecurity workforce, we did not receive the expected 
number and diversity of team participants from the junior enlisted and 
officer demographics. Ultimately, three limiting factors affected survey 
participation: 
• Geographic and temporal separation between the research team 
and pool of participants. 
• CDC guidance, Restriction of Movement (ROM), and vaccine 
availability regarding the Corona Virus Pandemic. 
• Limited personnel actively supporting high operation tempos to 
comply with social distancing and work-from-home guidance. 
5. Stated in Chapter I, tacit knowledge is difficult to capture; especially in 
the context of a comprehensive knowledge management framework. 
Although questionnaire participation represented a significant portion of 
our data points, the environment in which tacit knowledge exists—the 
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minds and actions of individual people—means we were unable to capture 
the full spectrum of solutions used by personnel to operate around the 
presence compound tacit knowledge barriers.  
6. While the event grammar of Monterey Phoenix is much easier to learn 
than a feature-rich language like C or Java, we encountered an unexpected 
learning curve with some of the language’s semantics and platform 
execution. Specifically, root actors with binary values, such as 
JQR_complete or JQR_incomplete, each doubled the number of resulting 
traces. In some cases, the diligent use of COORDINATE statements was 
needed to construct the necessary relationships between event phases and 
event actors.  
C. FUTURE STUDIES  
This study only covered tacit knowledge modeling within the Cyber Protection 
Teams, but the structure and methods described used can easily be expanded for future 
research opportunities. Some considerations for future research areas are:  
• Similar study using other areas of the Cyber Mission Force  
(1) Offensive Cyber Teams  
(2) Other Defensive Cyber Teams  
• Similar study to compare tacit knowledge pathologies between military 
service branches  
(1) E.g., explore the differences and approaches to tacit knowledge 
management between U.S. Army, Marine Corps, Navy, Air Force, Coast 
Guard, and Space Force.  
• An updated study in the next three to five years to compare and contrast 
how cyberspace workforce communities manage tacit knowledge over 
time. 
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(1) In the anecdotal experience of the research team, CMF teams are constantly 
in a state of churn to advance tactics, teamwork, and operations. A 
comparison between future findings and those addressed in this report may 
reveal interesting trends that could lead to better methods for workforce 
adaption.  
D. CONCLUSION  
Tacit knowledge has been identified a core factor that needs to be addressed within 
the Cyber Protection Force. Is it possible to measure and include this resource as an 
additional component in The Congruence Model? Yes, captured and analyzed in Chapter 
IV. The recommendations stated in this chapter include prescriptions for knowledge 
management that support CPT operations. Failing to do so may result in lost efficiency in 
both personnel training and mission effectiveness. At the individual team level, members 
and team leaders can implement models of stewardship discussed in this research that 
improve the effectiveness for all network assessment event phases. At the theater level, 
CPF leadership and operational commanders can review the Chapter IV findings to 




APPENDIX A. MONTEREY PHOENIX NETWORK ASSESSMENT 
BASELINE MODEL  
1 /* Model Schema*/  
2 SCHEMA Network_Assessment_Baseline  
3   
4 /* Root Event Actors */  
5 ROOT TeamLead: Training_complete;  
6 ROOT CyberPlanner: Training_complete;  
7 ROOT MELead: {Standard_execution, Familiar_with_workflow, Mission_driven_LL};  
8 ROOT MEOperator: {Training_complete, Received_turnover, JQR_complete, Selected_for_ME, Familiar_with_workflow};  
9   
10   
11 /* Root Event Phases*/  
12 ROOT TrackingEventPhase: Appoint_Team_Lead Appoint_Mission_Element_Lead;  
13 ROOT SiteSurveyEventPhase: Meet_Mission_Owner Discuss_network_composition;  
14 ROOT PreparationEventPhase:  
15      Review_survey_results ME_Operator_selection Prepare_for_assessment;  
16      Prepare_for_assessment: {Personnel_prep, DMSS_kit_prep, Administrative_prep};  
17      Personnel_prep: (Identify_training_goals Prepare_training_environment Commence_operator_training);  
18      DMSS_kit_prep: (Identify_techncal_requirements Prepare_DMSS_kits Pack_kits_for_travel);  
19      Administrative_prep: (Draft_Assessment_CONOP Finalize_CONOP Route_for_stakeholder_signatures);  
20 ROOT ExecutionEventPhase: Deploy_assessment_gear Collection_completes Return_home;  
21 ROOT AnalysisAAREventPhase: Upload_collection_to_lab Analyze_collection_data  
22                             Compile_findings_report Disseminate_final_AAR;  
23   
24   
25 /* Event Phase Coordination & Precedence */  
26 COORDINATE $a: TrackingEventPhase, $b: SiteSurveyEventPhase  
27      DO ADD $a PRECEEDS $b; OD;  
28   
29 COORDINATE $a: SiteSurveyEventPhase, $b: PreparationEventPhase  
30      DO ADD $a PRECEEDS $b; OD;  
31   
32 COORDINATE $a: PreparationEventPhase, $b: ExecutionEventPhase  
33      DO ADD $a PRECEEDS $b; OD;  
34   
35 COORDINATE $a: ExecutionEventPhase, $b: AnalysisAAREventPhase  









APPENDIX B. MONTEREY PHOENIX NETWORK ASSESSMENT 
PATHOLOGY OVERLAY (1 / 2) 
 
1 /* Model Schema*/  
2 SCHEMA Network_Assessment_Pathology_Overlay  
3   
4 /* ROOT Event Actors */  
5 ROOT TeamLead: (Training_complete | Training_incomplete);  
6 ROOT CyberPlanner: (Training_complete | Training_incomplete);  
7 ROOT MELead: {  
8      (Standard_execution | Accelerated_execution),  
9      (Familiar_with_workflow | Unfamiliar_with_workflow),  
10      (Mission_driven_LL | Customer_driven_LL)};  
11 ROOT MEOperator: {  
12      (Training_complete | Training_incomplete),  
13      (Received_turnover | No_turnover),  
14      (JQR_complete | JQR_incomplete),  
15      (Selected_for_ME | Not_selected_for_ME),  
16      (Familiar_with_workflow | Unfamiliar_with_workflow)};  
17   
18 /*Root Event Phases*/  
19 ROOT TrackingEventPhase: Appoint_Team_Lead Appoint_Mission_Element_Lead;  
20 ROOT SiteSurveyEventPhase: Meet_Mission_Owner Discuss_network_composition;  
21 ROOT PreparationEventPhase: Review_survey_results ME_Operator_selection Prepare_for_assessment  
22      Prepare_for_assessment: {Personnel_prep, DMSS_kit_prep, Administrative_prep};  
23      Personnel_prep: (Identify_training_goals Prepare_training_environment Commence_operator_training);  
24      DMSS_kit_prep: (Identify_techncal_requirements Prepare_DMSS_kits Pack_kits_for_travel);  
25      Administrative_prep: (Draft_Assessment_CONOP Finalize_CONOP Route_for_stakeholder_signatures);  
26 ROOT ExecutionEventPhase: Deploy_assessment_gear Collection_completes Return_home;  
27 ROOT AnalysisAAREventPhase: Upload_collection_to_lab Analyze_collection_data  
28                             Compile_findings_report Disseminate_final_AAR;  
29   
30 /* Event Phase Coordination & Precedence */  
31 COORDINATE $a: TrackingEventPhase, $b: SiteSurveyEventPhase  
32            DO ADD $a PRECEEDS $b; OD;  
33   
34 COORDINATE $a: SiteSurveyEventPhase, $b: PreparationEventPhase  
35            DO ADD $a PRECEEDS $b; OD;  
36   
37 COORDINATE $a: PreparationEventPhase, $b: ExecutionEventPhase  
38            DO ADD $a PRECEEDS $b; OD;  
39   
40 COORDINATE $a: ExecutionEventPhase, $b: AnalysisAAREventPhase  
41            DO ADD $a PRECEEDS $b; OD;  
42   
43 /* Event Actor Coordination & Precedence */  
44 COORDINATE $a: Appoint_Team_Lead FROM TrackingEventPhase,  
45            $b: TeamLead  
46            DO ADD $a PRECEEDS $b; OD;  
47   
48 COORDINATE $a: Appoint_Mission_Element_Lead FROM TrackingEventPhase,  
49            $b: MELead  
50            DO ADD $a PRECEEDS $b; OD;  
51   
52 COORDINATE $a: Unfamiliar_with_workflow FROM MELead,  
53            $b: Prepare_for_assessment FROM PreparationEventPhase  
54
55 
           DO ADD $a PRECEEDS $b; OD;  
57 COORDINATE $a: TeamLead,  
58            $b: MELead,  
59            $c: Compile_findings_report FROM AnalysisAAREventPhase  
60            DO ADD $a PRECEDES $c, $b PRECEDES $c; OD;  
54 
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APPENDIX C. MONTEREY PHOENIX NETWORK ASSESSMENT 
PATHOLOGY OVERLAY (2 / 2) 
61 /* Pathology 1 ──> Training pipeline / JQR Completion */  
62 REPORT Pathology1_stats { TITLE (“Scope “ $$scope “ Trace “ trace_id); };  CLEAR Pathology1_stats;  
63 IF #Training_incomplete FROM MEOperator THEN  
64     IF #JQR_incomplete FROM MEOperator THEN  
65         SAY(“Pathology 1: Compound positive reinforcement detected”) => Pathology1_stats;  
66         SAY(“MEOperator TK barriers for training & JQR”) => Pathology1_stats;  
67         SHOW Pathology1_stats;  
68 FI; FI;  
69 /* Pathology 2 ──> Missed Opportunities for Turnover */  
70 REPORT Pathology2a_stats { TITLE (“Scope “ $$scope “ Trace “ trace_id); };  CLEAR Pathology2a_stats;  
71 IF #Training_incomplete FROM MEOperator THEN  
72     IF #No_turnover FROM MEOperator THEN  
73         SAY(“Pathology 2a: Compound positive reinforcement detected”) => Pathology2a_stats;  
74         SAY(“MEOperator TK barriers for training & turnover”) => Pathology2a_stats;  
75         SHOW Pathology2a_stats; FI; FI; 
76 REPORT Pathology2b_stats { TITLE (“Scope “ $$scope “ Trace “ trace_id); };  CLEAR Pathology2b_stats;  
77 IF #No_turnover FROM MEOperator THEN  
78     IF #JQR_incomplete FROM MEOperator THEN  
79         SAY(“Pathology 2b: Compound positive reinforcement detected”) => Pathology2b_stats;  
80         SAY(“MEOperator TK barriers for turnover & JQR”) => Pathology2b_stats;  
81         SHOW Pathology2b_stats;  
82 FI; FI;  
83 /* Pathology 3 ──> ME Staffing & Experience Issue */  
84 REPORT Pathology3_stats { TITLE (“Scope “ $$scope “ Trace “ trace_id); };  CLEAR Pathology3_stats;  
85 IF #Training_incomplete FROM MEOperator THEN  
86     IF #JQR_incomplete FROM MEOperator THEN  
87         IF #Not_selected_for_ME FROM MEOperator THEN  
88            SAY(“Pathology 3: Compound positive reinforcement detected”) => Pathology3_stats;  
89            SAY(“MEOperator TK barriers impact ME selection”) => Pathology3_stats;  
90            SHOW Pathology3_stats;  
91 FI; FI; FI;  
92 /* Pathology 4 ──> Survey Team Lacks Experience  */  
93 REPORT Pathology4_stats { TITLE (“Scope “ $$scope “ Trace “ trace_id); };  CLEAR Pathology4_stats;  
94 IF #Training_incomplete FROM TeamLead THEN  
95     IF #Training_incomplete FROM CyberPlanner THEN  
96         SAY(“Pathology 4: Compound positive reinforcement detected”) => Pathology4_stats;  
97         SAY(“TL & Planner TK barriers impact survey/ execution phase”) => Pathology4_stats;  
98         SHOW Pathology4_stats;  
99 FI; FI;  
100 /* Pathology 5 ──> No Cross-CPT Workflow Continuity */  
101 REPORT Pathology5_stats { TITLE (“Scope “ $$scope “ Trace “ trace_id); };  CLEAR Pathology5_stats;  
102 IF #Unfamiliar_with_workflow FROM MELead THEN  
103     IF #Selected_for_ME FROM MEOperator THEN  
104         IF #Unfamiliar_with_workflow FROM MEOperator THEN  
105             SAY(“Pathology 5: Compound positive reinforcement detected”) => Pathology5_stats;  
106             SAY(“TL & Operator TK barriers in team familiarity”) => Pathology5_stats;  
107             SHOW Pathology5_stats;  
108 FI; FI; FI;  
109 /* Pathology 6 ──> Accelerated Assessment Barriers */  
110 REPORT Pathology6_stats { TITLE (“Scope “ $$scope “ Trace “ trace_id); };  CLEAR Pathology6_stats;  
111 IF #Accelerated_execution FROM MELead THEN  
112    SAY(“Pathology 6: Positive reinforcement detected”) => Pathology6_stats;  
113    SAY(“Mission Element TK barrier from accelerated execution”) => Pathology6_stats;  
114    SHOW Pathology6_stats;  
115 FI;  
116 /* Pathology 7 ──> Lessons Learned Barriers */  
117 REPORT Pathology7_stats { TITLE (“Scope “ $$scope “ Trace “ trace_id); };  CLEAR Pathology7_stats;  
118 IF #Customer_driven_LL FROM MELead THEN  
119     SAY(“Pathology 7: Positive reinforcement detected”) => Pathology7_stats;  
120     SAY(“Assessment LL TK barrier from customer-driven LL”) => Pathology7_stats;  
121     SHOW Pathology7_stats;  
122 FI;  
56 
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